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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
under U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) , being a case transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Order of the First District Court 
dismissing the Stockings' Complaint with prejudice under Rule 
41(b), U.R.C.P. The Stockings believe the trial court abused its 
discretion. The trial court had earlier denied two Motions for 
Summary Disposition made by the Defendants. A related case on 
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, Barber vs. Emporium, Supreme 
Court No. 880410, has been briefed. The relief requested in that 
case for Von Stocking, in part III, is similar to the relief 
requested for Mr. and Mrs. Stocking in this suit. The Stockings 
claim that the Defendants Barbers and Daines wrongfully interfered 
with a business arrangement they had with First Federal; that First 
Federal wrongfully breached an agreement to allow the Stockings to 
cure a Trust Deed Note default; and that Defendants Barbers and 
Daines failed to credit a judgment held against Von Stocking with 
the value of the property, taken in a Trust Deed Sale, in excess 
of the amount of the trust deed note owed to First Federal. 
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STATEMENT 
Did the trial court do ju; 
the case under Rule 41(b)? 
Was the motion for a new 
was granted? 
Were Stockings denied due 
to hold the required hearing? 
OF THE ISSUES 
I. 
tice to the Stockings in dismissing 
II • 
trial proper after Summary Judgment 
III. 
process by the trial court's failure 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative Constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules that support the relief Appellants seek: 
1. U.S. Constitution Amendment V: 
No person shall be. • .deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of 
law. . . 
2. U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, Section i: 
. . .No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citiz€>ns of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
3. Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law. 
4. Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11: 
All Courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be ministered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
5. Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration: 
In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on 
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting 
the motion may request a hearing and such 
request shall be granted. 
VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Stockings seek return of property and/or damages arising 
from the Defendants' conduct at a Trust Deed foreclosure in 1983. 
The Stockings filed suit November 3, 1983, against First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, certain of its officers, the Trust 
Deed Trustee, the Barbers, and their attorney, Mr. and Mrs. 
Stocking, as Trustors, had been in default on a Trust Deed note. 
They believed they had an agreement allowing them to cure the 
default. The day before the Trust Deed sale, the Barbers bought 
First Federal Savings and Loan's beneficiary rights, and then 
proceeded themselves with the Trust Deed sale. The Barbers' 
interest in the property was wholly motivated by a previously 
attained judgment against Von Stocking, but not Mrs. Stocking, 
arising from Von Stocking's involvement in the Emporium Limited 
Partnership (Record Case No. 880410 pp 14-17). The Stocking's 
Trust Deed to First Federal preceded the Barber's judgment against 
Mr. Stocking by several years. 
Four causes of action were stated in the Amended Complaint 
November 28, 1983 (Record pp. 16-35). The Stockings alleged: (1) 
that the Barbers caused First Federal to breach an agreement to 
allow the Stockings to cure the default in the Trust Deed on their 
residence; (2) that just before the sale, both First Federal and 
the Barbers fraudulently misrepresented their intentions to the 
Stockings; (3) that the Barbers wrongfully interfered with the 
Stockings' contractual relations with First Federal; and, (4) that 
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the Barbers wrongfully interfered with the Stockings advantageous 
economic relationship with First Federal. 
First Federal Savings and Loan and Barbers are basically two 
groups of Defendants, each of which is separately represented. 
Both groups of Defendants unsuccessfully filed separate Motions for 
Summary Judgment. By Memorandum Decision entered March 19, 1984, 
and an Order entered April 3, 1984, (Record, 129-30; 135-6), the 
trial court found that there w€>re genuine issues of fact regarding 
whether an accord was reached about curing the default. The Court 
said that other issues "must be tried to make these determinations'1 
concerning First Federal (Record, 130). 
The Barber group did not move for partial Summary Judgment 
until September 8, 1987. By its Memorandum Decision entered 
October 7, 1987, and Order filed October 26, 1987, (Record 215-17), 
the trial court also denied this motion. The court found there 
were questions of fact as to whether the Barbers and their 
attorney, N. George Dairies, interfered with the rights of the 
Stockings by communicating with First Federal to interfere with 
Stockings* rights. The court's words included: "Where the facts 
are contested. Summary Judgment is not appropriate and the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment will be denied" (Record, 215). 
Plaintiff's discovery proceeded intermittently after the 
Complaint was filed and after Summary Judgment was denied. 
Responses to the Stockings' last requests were filed January 6, 
1988 (Record 238-40) . In January 1986 and February 1987, the Court 
had brought its own Order to Show Cause inquiries as to whether the 
2 
case should be dismissed (Record 157; 160). In both instances, 
Plaintiffs said they had additional discovery to do and each Order 
to Show Cause was dismissed (158; 170). After the second was 
dismissed February 2, 1987 (Record 170), Plaintiffs filed an 
Objection to the Orders to Show Cause (February 6, 1987; Record 
170), in which they anticipated requesting a trial date within the 
year (Record 161). Discovery was proceeding for eleven months, 
until January 6, 1988. Thereafter, none of the parties filed 
anything on this case until First Federal moved for dismissal with 
prejudice under Rule 41(b) November 28, 1988 (Record 240). Their 
sole argument was that the Complaint had not been prosecuted fast 
enough. The Barbers and their attorney joined in the motion 
December 2, 1988 (Record 255). Nothing had happened in this case 
between January 6, 1988, and November 28, 1988, but Stockings and 
Barbers had been in litigation in two other cases in Cache County 
with the Barbers, case nos. 17630 and 25616. Both of these cases 
involved appeals. The first of these was Barber vs. Emporium, 
Cache County Uo. 17630, Court of Appeals No. 870128-CA. The second 
is Barber vs. Emporium, Cache County No. 25616, Supreme Court No. 
880410. The latter case attempted to renew the judgment against 
the Emporium. Its appeal is pending before the Supreme Court. 
December 6, 1988, Stockings gave notice of their objections 
to the dismissal. On December 9, 1988, they requested a hearing 
on the matter, and filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial (Record, 
257-64). At the same time, Stockings also paid the $50 jury fee 
(Record, 280) , and requested that the matter be tried before a jury 
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(Record, 278). December 21, 1988, the Court sent a Notice of Trial 
Setting, for three days of jury trial, to all counsel (Record, 268-
69) . January 3, 1989, the Barbers and their attorney filed a Reply 
Memorandum, setting forth their only written comments on dismissal 
as a Reply to the Plaintiff's objection, but failed to send a copy 
of this Reply to the Plaintiffs (Record, 270-72). Plaintiffs were 
not aware it had been filed. The Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision January 19, 1989, granting Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss 
with Prejudice (Record, 273). The Court did not allow Plaintiffs 
their requested hearing under Rule of Practice 2.8(g), (as it then 
existed), or Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(9). 
Stockings filed their Notice of Objections to Proposed 
Findings in Order of Dismissal on January 25, 1989 (Record 274). 
The Stockings pointed out that the Court had denied them the 
hearing to which they were entitled by Rule 4-501(9), Code of 
Judicial Administration. Stockings also argued that the Defendants 
had not shown that having a trial would be prejudicial to the 
Defendants. The Stockings finally noted that the Court had set a 
trial date (Record 273-82), and had believed that all the parties 
relied on that setting because no one objected when it was made. 
Nevertheless, the Court signed a Dismissal with Prejudice January 
27, 1989 (Record, 289), and this appeal followed. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Mew Trial was filed February 6, 1989 
(Record, 291). An order denying the same was filed March 14, 1989 
(Record, 305) . The Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court 
April 11, 1989 (Record, 307). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Failure of the trial court to grant the Stockings a hearing 
before dismissing under Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., ought to be consid-
ered reversible error and an abuse of discretion. This court 
should also rule on the merits, as shown in the pleadings, that the 
trial court did not give Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and 
to do justice, and order that the case be set for trial. 
Prior rulings by the trial court and affidavits submitted by 
the Stockings adequately show there are issues which need to be 
tried. The Court actually allowed the matter to be set on the 
trial calendar during the pendency of the Motion to Dismiss, and 
no objections were raised to the trial settings. During the pro-
ceedings on this case, somewhat related issues were being litigated 
between Mr. Stocking and the Barbers in other cases involving the 
same court and the same judge. The judge's decision is on appeal 
in a related case before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Although the appeals court has upheld dismissing cases under 
Rule 41(b), the other cases were situations where the parties 
failed to show up for trial or there had been no activity for more 
than the one year Plaintiffs were not directly active in this case. 
The Stockings Motion for a "Mew Trial," after the court dis-
missed on a motion, was procedurally correct. It is consistent 
with the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Moon Lake Electric 
Assoc., Inc. v. Ultra Systems Western Const., 767 P.2d. 125 (Utah 
App . 1988) . 
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ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE TRIAL COURT DID MOT DO JUSTICE TO THE STOCKINGS IN 
DISMISSING THE CASE UNDER RULE 4 K b ) . 
If the trial court's decision to dismiss does not do justice 
to the parties, the trial court abused its discretion. Unless 
substantial prejudice or injustice will result to the adverse 
party, the opportunity to be heard should be considered more 
important that moving calendars along. West inghouse Electric 
Supply v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d. 876 (Utah 
1975). While trial courts have broad discretion to decide whether 
a claim has been pursued with due diligence, if it appears the 
trial court abused its discretion and there is a likelihood an 
injustice has been done, an appeals court should review the 
dismissal. Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d. 
1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). The appeals court should review the 
history of this case to see whether dismissing it would result in 
an injustice. A review of the facts shows Stockings have not had 
an opportunity to be heard equivalent to the opportunities to be 
heard in cases where 4Kb) motions have been upheld. 
In Utah Oil Co. v. Harris 565 P.2d. 1135 (Utah 1987), a 
sixteen-month lapse after a pre-trial conference had been suspended 
for settlement negotiations was held not to be too long. The court 
said that during that time either party could have requested an 
earlier trial setting. When neither party had obtained a trial 
setting, the court found that such a lapse was acceptable, and the 
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trial court's dismissal under Rule 41 was reversed. Utah Oil Co, 
applies the standard for review, and this case, like that one, 
should be remanded for trial. 
Defendants convinced the trial court to decide the five years 
between November 1983 and December 1988 was enough to order a 
dismissal. They have referred to Brasher Motor and Finance Company 
v. Richard A. Brown, 23 Utah 2d. 247, 461 P.2d. 464 (1969). The 
trial court in Brasher waited five and one-half years before 
dismissing the action. The time period is the only similarity with 
the present case, however. In Brasher there had been no activity 
for that 5'£ years: no discovery, no motions, and no rulings that 
there were questions of fact. The decision by Justice Henriod 
acknowledges that after a Complaint for Replevin was filed by a car 
company, the sheriff could not find the property, and that a Coun-
terclaim was filed a month later "as long as a hippie's hairdo." 
The Plaintiffs then moved to dismiss, and the case sat dormant: 
Thereafter everyone treated the litigation 
with a silent reverence accorded to that which 
is interred, until, low and behold, 5'<6 years 
later the Browns, like Abou Ben Adhem, awoke 
from a deep dream of peace and attempted to 
exhume and reactive what for all intents and 
purposes appeared to have been a litigious 
corpse. 
The matter was brought to the attention of the 
trial judge, who on his own motion dismissed 
the whole works, Brasher's Complaint and 
Brown's Counterclaim, id., at 464. 
The present case should not be equated with Brasher . There has not 
been a five year period of total silence and inactivity. The trial 
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court here had already ruled that Stockings have a right to have 
the facts heard• 
Another case the trial court could have been persuaded by, but 
which is distinguishable, is Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d. 1323 
(Utah 1975) . Maxfield had been set for trial before the dismissal 
was granted. The action was filed in October 1972, and a trial 
setting made for October 1974. The court set the trial date months 
in advance, and Plaintiff had objected. However, the objection had 
not been heard and the trial date remained on the calendar. When 
the parties appeared for trial, the Plaintiff did not have an 
expert witness for this malpractice action and moved to continue 
the matter. The trial court dismissed the case. The dismissal was 
upheld on appeal. However, a dissent was filed in which Justices 
El let and Maughan said the Plaintiff should have been allowed to 
produce what evidence he had, and used the trial date, even if his 
motion to continue had not been granted. Because a trial date had 
already been set, the opportunity to do justice to the parties was 
far more established than it has been in the instant case, where 
the parties have never backed away from an actual trial date. 
The Defendants1 here mostly relied upon a decision from the 
Utah Appeals Court entitled Charlie Brown Construction Company v. 
Leisure Sports Incorporated, 470 P.2d. 1368 (Utah App. 1987). 
However, this case should also not be controlling here. A trial 
date had also been set in that case. On the eve of trial, a 
settlement appeared imminent. No one appeared for the June 18, 
1984, trial, so the trial court dismissed the matter. Apparently 
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settlement did not result, and the dismissal did not come to the 
parties* attention for another seven months. March 18, 1985, a 
hearing was held on the Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the 
Dismissal. After reviewing the entire file, which included the 
history of the case and the history of the discovery and the 
protective orders, the trial court stuck with the dismissal. 
Nowhere does it appear in the opinion that the trial court made any 
ruling on the merits of the case, such as it would have done had 
there been Motions for Summary Judgment. The facts in Char 1ie 
Brown are not close enough to the instant case to justify using it 
as a precedent. Stockings did not miss a court date. There were 
questions of fact. 
Similarly, the citation in Charlie Brown to Lake Meredith 
Reservoir Company v. Amity Mutual Irrigation Company, 698 P.2d. 
1340 (Colo. 1985) does not suggest facts sufficiently related to 
the present case sufficient to justify dismissing the action. The 
value of the Lake Meredith decision is to show that the present 
action, pending for five years, and during which Defendants' 
Summary Judgment motions were denied, should go to trial. The 
Stockings may have been slow, but they were not inactive. Lake 
Meredith is the classic example of what inactive lawsuits can be 
like. The complaint was filed in 1931 and finally resolved by 
dismissal in 1983. That is 52 years. After 1931, the Defendants 
moved the case into the Federal Court for diversity reasons, where 
it sat for eight years. After Defendants' identities changed 
because of assignments of various irrigation rights, the case 
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returned to Colorado State courts until 1944. when it was dismissed 
without prejudice. Plaintiffs refiled the case and an Answer was 
filed in 1944. In 1945, a Stipulation was entered, by which the 
parties (but not the Court) agreed the case would not be set for 
trial, but held on the Court's docket. In 1947, Defendants moved 
to dismiss; the Motion was denied. In 1949, the case was retired 
from the Court's docket on the judge's motion, but not dismissed. 
In 1982, Plaintiff moved the case to the Colorado water court, and 
in 1983, moved for Summary Judgment on some of the issues. In 
1983, additional Defendants moved to intervene and to dismiss for 
lack of prosecution. The case was dismissed, but it had been 52 
years since it was filed, and 37 since it was refiled. The 
Colorado court considered this "an unusual delay" and approved the 
dismissal, saying the trial court had that much discretion. The 
Court agreed that 37 years was an unusual period for no activity. 
In the appeal, the trial court considered not only the Plaintiff's 
efforts in 1983 to resume prosecution, but the length of the delay, 
the reasons for the delay, the prejudice to the Defendants, the 
difficulties of trying the case at such a late date, and held it 
appropriate for the trial court to consider all these things and 
inquire into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
delay. 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to make an 
adequate inquiry into the totality of the circumstances outlined 
in Lake Meredith, and in so failing, abused its discretion. One 
factual issue in Lake Meredith was the effect a water storage 
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reservoir would have on irrigation in the area. The appeals court 
thought that between 1945 and 1983 the parties could have developed 
some opinions. That is the closest the Colorado court came to the 
merits of the action. In the present case, the court actually 
reviewed the merits, and found the Plaintiffs should be able to go 
to Court. It did not justify dismissing the case, using the same 
or similar review standards approved from Lake Meredith in the 
Charlie Brown decision. Stockings did not nearly approach the 
failures to prosecute shown in the Charlie Brown and Lake Meredith 
examples. Those cases support Stockings1 claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
The following elements demonstrate the court's abuse of 
discretion in the present action: 
1. The Court has already denied motions by both 
groups of Defendants for summary judgment, 
holding there were issues of fact which should 
be tried. 
2. Defendants could have requested trial in 1988, 
during which time neither party filed pleadings 
with the Court, but did not. 
3. The Plaintiffs were busy with the Barber group 
of Defendants before the same Judge in the same 
Court. One action involved writs and the Court 
of Appeals' decision on the original judgment; 
the other involved the effort to renew the 
judgment, and is now briefed before this Court. 
4. There was no pretrial conference and no trial 
set, so Plaintiffs were not ignoring an oppor-
tunity to be heard. 
5. When Defendants' Motion was made, Plaintiffs 
immediately requested trial and paid the jury 
fee. Before the Court ruled on the Motion, 
the Court actually accepted the fee and set 
the matter for trial. 
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6. Plaintiffs also requested a hearing on 
Defendants' Motion, which was not granted. 
7. During the first four years of the action, 
there was considerable activity, before the 
same Judge, involving the Plaintiffs and the 
Barber group of Defendants, plus discovery 
requests by Plaintiffs, and the denial of 
summary judgment, against the Defendants. 
II. 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPER AFTER 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED. 
Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P. has been interpreted by the Utah Court of 
Appeals to allow a motion for a new trial even when there has not, 
in fact, been a "trial.11 Moon Lake Electric Assoc, Inc. v. Ultra 
Systems Western Constr., Inc . , 767 P.2d. 125 (Utah App. 1988). The 
Court of Appeals held that while Rules 59 and 55 do not address the 
availability of a motion for a "new" trial following Summary 
Judgment, that such a motion was nevertheless procedurally correct. 
The Court said: 
Neither Utah R. of Civ. P. 59 (new trial) nor 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment) 
directly addresses the availability of the 
motion for a "new" trial following summary 
judgment. Our analysis of Rule 59(a) and the 
rationale behind it leads us to conclude that 
such a motion is, nonetheless, procedurally 
correct. 
Thereafter, the Court's analysis followed, including the 
holding that : 
The concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is 
broad enough to include a rehearing of any 
matter decided by the Court without a jury. . 
. While there may be some logic in con-
cluding that there can be no new trial where 
no trial has yet occurred, we should be less 
concerned with what this "reconsideration" 
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procedure may be called, so long as the pro-
cedure is available to litigants. 
One of Defendants' arguments to the trial court was there had 
been no trial, so the Motion was not properly taken. This argument 
seems to have been accepted by Judge Chr istof fersen, but it is 
contrary to the holding of the Utah Appeals Court in Moon Lake. 
The Moon Lake opinion, made December 29, 1988, was relied on by the 
Stockings in requesting the trial court to review the case under 
Rules 59(a)(1), and (7) (Record, 291-93). In the motion for a new 
trial, the Stockings asserted the court had abused its discretion 
and made errors in law. This argument is amply supported by the 
facts and law recited herein. There is not a legal precedent for 
dismissing a case which has been inactive for only a year, which 
was never set for trial, and in which the delay was not unusual. 
The interests of justice, moreover, require that the parties have 
an opportunity to be heard. The only trial setting the Court ever 
made in this matter was scrapped by the Court before the date 
arrived. 
Defendants* argument to the trial court which relied on 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d. 1375 (Utah 1988), is also 
misplaced. That case discusses the trial court's discretion in 
considering motions for a new trial. In Christenson, trial had 
previously been set, and a jury trial held. The court refused to 
grant a new trial because the court had previously set the trial 
date. It said trial would go forward even if the discovery had 
not been completed. Plaintiffs there had asked for a new trial 
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because the jury voted with the Defendant. The Christenson appeal 
decision said that the jury's verdict was supportable even without 
contested expert testimony. Thus, Christenson deals with whether 
a new trial should have been granted where trial before a jury had 
already taken place, and the court found the jury verdict to have 
been adequately supported. It demonstrates the intent to allow 
parties the chance to be heard and to have justice done. That 
intention has not been manifested by the trial court in this case. 
III. 
STOCKINGS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND/OR FAILURE TO 
HOLD THE REQUIRED HEARING. 
Where a motion would resolve the case against the party 
opposing it, the party opposing the motion is entitled to a 
hearing. Under prior Rule of Practice 2.8(g), which is now Rule 
4-501(9) in the Code of Judicial Administration, the Stockings were 
entitled to the hearing they requested, but did not get: 
In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on 
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting 
the motion may request a hearing and such 
request shal1 be granted . . . (emphasis 
supplied) . 
It was not necessary for Stockings to submit affidavits 
concerning why they had not requested a trial setting earlier or 
done additional discovery. The court had already ruled, against 
both groups of Defendants, that there were facts which had to be 
tried. Affidavits supporting those facts were already in the 
record. Moreover, Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration, 
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says that in the motion such as Defendants1 Rule 41(b) motion, the 
party resisting the motion may request a hearing and the request 
shall be granted. In Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d. 649 (Utah App. 
1987) the Court held: 
According to the Utah Supreme Court , the 
meaning of the word "shall" is usually or 
ordinarily presumed to be mandatory. Herr v. 
Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d. 728 (Utah 1974); 
State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d. 45, 347 P.2d. 
1111 (1960) . 
When Stockings asked for a hearing December 9, 1988, they 
expected to get one. They did not expect the case would be ruled 
on without a hearing. In fact, they thought the Defendants' motion 
had been denied because they next received a Notice of Trial 
Setting from the Court. One reason for a hearing is that the trial 
court, in exercising its discretion, has to face the parties. It 
is possible all the matters could have been presented to the Court 
in writing, but that is not the point, The Court had the 
obligation to grant a hearing to hear whatever may have been said, 
again or in addition, before granting such a motion. This trial 
court abused its discretion in not doing this. Whatever analysis 
the Defendants give to Plaintiffs' reasons for not having moved 
ahead sooner, the duty of the trial court was to allow the 
Plaintiffs to justify what they were doing at a hearing. The court 
did not perform its duty. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants have acknowledged there may have been revers-
ible procedural error in the trial court's failure to not have the 
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hearing Stockings requested. Now that the case is on appeal, the 
hearing phase could be eliminated and the case directly remanded 
for trial on the merits. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have an 
opportunity to be heard and to do justice. In cases where Rule 
41(b) dismissals have been sustained, trial has been set or there 
has been no activity for far more than the one? year period 
Plaintiffs were not very active in this particular case. 
Plaintiffs had no duty to submit additional data to the trial court 
justifying their delay, where affidavits in the file and prior 
rulings by the court had previously held there were issues which 
must be tried. The court certainly knew about the related actions 
between the Stockings and the Barbers. It appeared ready to get 
rid of the Stockings and everyone associated with them, quickly if 
possible. The Barber v. Emporium matter is on appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court (No. 880410) as a result of the same attitude by the 
same judge. In this case, Stockings seek the value of their 
property in excess of what was owed on the Trust Deed Note because 
they had relied, to their detriment, on the actions of First 
Federal, the Trustee, the Barbers, and Mr. Daines about the Trust 
Deed Foreclosure. 
In the related appeal Barber v. Emporium, Mr. Stocking 
challenges Barbers' and the trial court's improvements to a prior 
judgment in connection with renewing it, and appeal the court's 
refusal to allow offsets required by law and by equity. Trial of 
this present case would allow a measurement of the damages to 
Stockings for the value of their property in excess of the Trust 
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Deed Note. The two appeals are closely related. Barbers had 
admitted they were only interested in the Stockings* house at First 
Federal's Trust Deed Sale because of their prior judgment (Record, 
Supreme Court Appeal No. 880410, pp. 14-17, set out in Addendum 
Item 4 of Appellant's Brief in the same case). Mrs. Stocking is 
a party to this suit, but is not a party in the other suit. 
The Stockings believe they are victims of judicial prejudice 
or abuse of discretion by Judge Christoffersen's rulings in both 
this case and Case No. 880410 that is also on appeal. They ask 
this court to remand the case for trial, and grant the Appellants 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal as allowed by Rule 33 and 34 
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1989. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1989, four true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, Case No. 
890345-CA, was mailed postage prepaid to each of the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
DAINES & KANE 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents 
108 North Main, Suite 201 
Logan, UT 84321 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, 
Record 286-290 • 
Notice of Objections to Proposed Findings and Order of 
Dismissal, Record 274-282. 
Motion for New Trial and Memorandum, Record 291-296. 
Responses to Motion, Record 297-300. 
Reply by Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for New Trial, 
Record 301-303. 
Memorandum Decision, March 19, 1984, denying Summary 
Judgment, Record 129-130. 
Memorandum Decision, October 7, 1987, denying Summary 
Judgment, Record 215. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, Record 304-306. 
Notice of Appeal, Record 307-308. 
Appellants also request the Court take judicial notice 
of Appeal No. 881410, currently before the Utah Supreme 
Court, including pages 14-17 thereof which are included 
here. 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER and BRIAN CHADAZ as 
officers and as individuals; 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
successor beneficiaries; 
N. GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN 
DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 22183 
In this matter Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. 
Bearnson, filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute the 
same and therewith filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of said Motion, and Defendants Norman Barber, Helen 
Barber, and N. George Daines joined in said Motion in writing. 
Plaintiffs objected to said Motion and filed their objection with 
a Memorandum in support thereof in writing. The Court having read 
4-
-2-
and considered said Motions and the Memoranda in support and 
opposition thereto, having examined the file, and on January 19, 
1989 having made its Memorandum Decision in writing, now makes the] 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT \CfSC ? 
^ 
From the record in the file on this matter, the C^u^t^ finds: 
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint was filed November 3 , / ^ 2 a n d a 
Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain 
Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, Fred 
Hunsaker, Bri an Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson from proceeding with B\ 
Trusteefs sale of Plaintiffs1 property* 
2. The Trustee's sale scheduled November 3, 1983 was 
postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4, 
1983, a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Chris toffersen] 
on Plaintiffs1 Temporary Restraining Order. As a result of the 
hearing, Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order was dismissed on 
November 4, 1983, and the Trustee's sale as rescheduled was 
conducted the same day. 
3. On November 7, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
4. On November 28, 1983, Plaintiffs filed an Amended 
Complaint. 
5. On December 8, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
6. On February 3, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, 
which was denied by the Court in a Memorandum Decision dated Marchj 
19, 1984. 
7. On March 21, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial. 
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Plaintiffs objected to the Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in 
their objection, "Plaintiffs intend to prepare and complete 
discovery both with interrogatories and depositions." 
8. On July 6, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, 
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Second Notice of Readiness for Trial, 
to which Plaintiffs objected stating, "... plaintiffs are 
proceeding with discovery.11 
9. On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and a 
Request For Admission on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson, to which 
Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 and Chadaz filed Answers 
on August 10, 1984. 
10. On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion, 
issued an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show 
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute the same. 
11. On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Court*s Order to Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plain-
tiffs intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence 
has been completed. The appraiser has not completed the work he 
indicated would be done sometime ago and Plaintiffs are reminding 
him of the commitment to complete the work." 
12. On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion, 
issued an Order, returnable February 9, 1987, for Plaintiffs to 
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute the same. 
13. On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the 
Courtfs Order to Show Cause, and in their motion stated, "Plain-
tiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been preparing 
to go forward with it. ... They desire that this matter eventually 
be set for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a request 
within the year." 
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14. On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of 
Request For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For 
Production of Documents" on Defendants Barber. These discovery 
requests were answered by Defendants Barber on March 11, 1987. 
15. On September 4, 1987, Defendants Barber moved the Court 
for partial summary judgment, which motion was denied by the 
Courts Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987. 
16. On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of 
Interrogatories" on Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and 
Bearnson. Defendants First Federal and Hunsaker answered the 
Interrogatories on December 23, 1987; Defendant Bearnson answered 
the Interrogatories on December 22, 1987, and Defendant Chadaz 
answered the Interrogatories on December 23, 1987. 
17. No action has been taken by Plaintiffs on their claim 
since December 23, 1987. 
18. Based upon the foregoing Findings from the record in the 
file, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute 
their claims in this case in due course and without unreasonable 
delay. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein as against all 
Defendants be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
It is further ORDERED that the trial date for this case of 
April 11, 1989 as a second setting and May 23, 1989 as a first 
setting be and are stricken. 
DATED this
 €
^j day of January, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served upon Plain-
tiffs1 counsel, Raymond N. Malouf, personally by delivering a copy 
to his office at 150 East 200 North in Logan, Utah this 20th 
day of January, 1989, and that an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served 
upon N. George Daines, III, Attorney for Defendants Barber, 
personally by delivering a copy to his office at 108 North Main, 
Suite 200, Logan, Utah, this 20th day of January, 1989. 
TTttany 
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/20 
Raymond N. Malcuf/md (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North. Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE. STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife. 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, et. al. 
Defendants* 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 22183 
Come now the Plaintiffs and serve Notice of their Objections 
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal. Notice 
is also given of objections to the entry of the Memorandum 
Decision. The objections are as follows* 
ABSENCE OF HEARING VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS1 RIGHTS 
1. Entry of the Memorandum Decision and the proposed 
Findings and Dismissal violate Rule 4-501(9). Code of Judicial 
Administration (C.J.A.) which provides as follows: 
In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on 
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting 
the motion may request a hearing and such 
request shall be granted . . . 
December 8. 1983. the Plaintiffs requested this matter be set for 
hearing under Rule of Practice 2.8(g) . Rules of Practice. Rule 
2.8(g) was replaced by C.J.A. Rule 4-501(9). The language in both 
rules is identical. It is not optional whether a hearing will be 
granted. A hearing was timely requested but was not granted. This 
denied the Plaintiffs the due process they are entitled to* The 
court has no authority, under these Rules, to issue a Memorandum 
1 
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Decision dismissing the Plaintiffs* cause of action with prejudice, 
without a hearing. Entry of such an Order, and entry of the 
Memorandum Decision, may also show prejudice on the part of the 
court, and violate Cannons 2 & 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct* 
A TRIAL DATE WAS ALREADY SET 
2. This case was already set for trial before the Memorandum 
Decision, December 8, 1988 the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Readiness for Trial, requesting the matter be set for a jury trial, 
and tendered the jury fee. The jury fee was accepted by the court 
December 9, 1988, and had the name of the Judge imprinted on the 
receipt. Within the Notice of Readiness for Trial was a Notice that 
opposing counsel had 10 days to object to the Request for Trial 
Setting. There was no objection filed by either opposing counsel. 
On December 21, 1988, the court sent notice that trial was set 
for April 11-13 (or May 23-25) to all counsel. None of the parties 
objected to those settings. To dismiss with prejudice denies to 
the Plaintiffs their right to go to court. On December 20, 1988, 
the moving Defendants1 Reply Memorandum acknowledged that the 
Request for a Trial Setting had been filed. Notice of the trial 
dates was given December 21, 1988. Plaintiffs, and apparently all 
the parties, considered this a response denying the Defendants' 
Motion for dismissal. 
Copies of the Request for Trial Setting, Receipt, and Notice 
of Setting are attached to this Notice of Objections. 
TRIAL REQUEST WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANTS 
3. Betweeen the November 25, 1988 Motion to Dismiss, and the 
filing of Barbers' and their attorney's Response to Request for 
Production of Documents in January, 1988, there is approximately 
11 months. While it is true that the Plaintiffs could have 
requested a trial setting during that 11 month period of time, it 
is also true that the Defendants could have requested one too. 
Granting the Motion to Dismiss prejudices Plaintiffs, who were also 
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busy with cases related to some of these Defendants. The court 
already denied separate motions by both groups of Defendants for 
Summary Judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact. 
Unlike Charlie Brown, an actual trial setting was not ignored. 
Only 14 months have lapsed since the court denied Summary Judgment 
for the Barbers, and 11 months since Barbers answered Plaintiffs' 
last discovery request. In Utah Oil, a 16 month lapse was not: too 
long for nothing to happen. Lots happened between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants Barbers during the 11 months. In Case No .25616, 
numerous pleadings were filed between the Plaintiffs and the Barber 
group of Defendants. One of the issues there was whether the court 
should allow Summary Judgment to the Barbers to renew a prior 
judgment. The court allowed it, and Stocking is appealing. In No. 
25616 the court was reminded it allowed the Stockings to pursue 
their claim for equitable offsets, against; the Renewal Judgment and 
against Barbers, by this lawsuit (No. 22183) which addresses the 
wrongful taking of Stockings1 property. To grant Defendants* 
Motion here, without a hearing, is unfair and shows judicial 
prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Granting the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is an abuse of 
the court 's discretion because it violates Rule of Practice 2.8(g) , 
it violates Rule 4-501(9) of the Code of Judicial Administration; 
it overlooks the fact that a trial setting was already made, with 
jury fee and Notice of Readiness accepted by the court, before a 
ruling was made on this Motion; and ignores the merits of 
Plaintiffs' case conflicting with prior orders. The 11 month lapse 
before granting Defendants* Motions was not idle time. The court 
should use its discretion to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to 
be heard, and not sign the proposed Findings and Order. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 1989./—) 
Raymoytcf N. Malouf / \ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs I / 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of January, 1989 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL, Civil No. 22183, mailed 
postage prepaid to the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. N. George Daines, Esq. 
Post Office Box 525 108 North Main #201 
Logan, Utah 84321 Logan, Utah 84321 
)<y?\/ck, cdkM*^a.*<j 
Secretary 
Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ISO East 200 North. Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
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VON Ki STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
NOTICE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL 
Plaintiffs, 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
Civil No. 22163 
Defendants. 
TO THE JUDGE OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for 
the Plaintiffs herewith certifies: 
it He has interviewed all known witnesses who might be 
called upon in the trial of the case. 
2t That such drawings, documents, physical evidence and/or 
other exhibits as they may choose to offer are prepared or will be 
prepared and ready by any expected trial date. 
3# That such use of the rules of discovery as counsel feels 
necessary for the trial of this cause have been completed and the 
case is at issue. 
4. That all the examinations and depositions which counsel 
feels necessary have been concluded. 
5. That the parties hereto have attempted settlement, but 
settlement at this time cannot be made. 
6. Counsel does desire pretrial. 
7. Counsel requests a jury trial. 
1 
8# Expected time for trial is three (3) days. 
9t The below signed attorney represents the statements made 
herein are true and correct and requests the court to act in 
reliance thereon* 
10. A copy hereof was mailed this date to I. Brent Hoggan, 
Esq., at Post Office Box 525, Logan, Utoh, and N. George Daines, 
Esq. at 108 North Mam, Suite 201, Logan, Utah. 
OPPOSING COUNSEL HAS TEN (10) DAYS TO OBJECT TO ANY OF THE 
ABOVE. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL BE DEEMED AS AN ACCEPTANCE. 
Dated this 8th day of December, 1988, 
<r 
<
^--&*. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of December, 1988, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Readiness for Trial, 
Civil No. 22183 was mailed postage prepaid to the following? 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. 
Post Office Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
M. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main, Suite 201 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Secretary 
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SAVE THIS RECEIPT *+•*:* SAVE THIS SECEJH 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STOCKING, VON K. 
STOCKING, DONNA H. 
-VS-
Plaintiff, 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
HUNSAKER, FRED 
Defendant. 
TO: 
S E E 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OF SETTING NO. 1 
Case No. 830022183 CN 
A T T A C H M E N T 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION 
IS SET F O R L J U R Y TRIAL IN'THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
CACHE COUNTY*TOuffH0USE, 140 NORTH 100 WEST, 
LOGAN, UTAH. 
DATE; 04/11/89 to 04/13/89 
05/23/89 to 05/25/89 
TIME: 10:00 AM, AS A SECOND SETTING 
10:00 AM, AS A FIRST SETTING 
* MQUCE: The Clerk will notify counsel on cases of second settings as 
soon as possible up to \ day before trial as to whether the matter will 
be tried. If no objections to the above dates are received within 10 
days hereof, it will be presumed said dates are satisfactory and not in 
conflict with any other matters!" ""~ -•• * - - ^ « m * i « ^ . 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF SETTING, postage prepaid, to the attachedflist of 
attorneys at the addresses set forth, this c2J day ofJLJu^yAM^ * 
19 T& . at LOGAN, UTAH. 
Seth S. Allen 
CACHE County Clerk «*?m**, 
r' - ^ - 'l. I . //C DrCU-88 \ 
Depaty-Clerk 
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A T T A C H M E N T 
MALOUF, RAYMOND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
150 EAST 200 NORTH 
LOGAN UT 84321 
DAINES, N. GEORGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
108 NORTH MAIN 
LOGAN UT 84321 
HOGGAN, L. BRENT 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Raymond N . Ma 1cat/rod (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 7152-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
et al . , 
Defendants. Civil No. 22183 
Come now the Plaintiffs in this matter, and move for a new 
trial in this matter. The Motion is allowed by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(1) and (7). This Motion is made within 10 days 
after entry of the Order cf Dismissal with Prejudice* It is 
supported by the Affidavit of the undersigned counsel, the file, 
an$ the Memorandum. 
Dated this 6th day of February, 1989. 
>n4 iJ. Mai Raymond V loi 
Attorney for PlaiVitiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Civil No. 
22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. N. George Daines, Esq. 
56 West Center 108 North Main, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 525 Logan, Utah 84321 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
W B 0 * fjgj Number, HfS 
FILFD 
Fi"B o 1989 
Secretary 
Raymond N. Halouf/md (#2067) 
HALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 8432:1 
Telephone (601) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
et al . , 
Defendants. Civil No. 22183 
Plaintiffs submit this Memorandum in support of the Motion for 
New Trial under Rule 59(a)(1) and (7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Rule provides for a motion for a new trial, even if there 
has in fact not been a trial. See Moon Lake Electric Association, 
Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 870212-CA, 99 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 25, December, 1988. This case involved a motion for a 
new trial after summary judgment was granted. The court said: 
Neither Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (new 
trial) nor Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
(summary judgment) directly address the 
availability of a motion for "new" trial 
following summary judgment. Our analysis of 
Rule 59(a) and the rational behind it leads us 
to conclude that such a motion is, 
nonetheless, procedurally correct. 
An Order of Dismissal with Prejudice entered on this case 
January 27, 1989, This Motion is filed within 10 days after said 
Order . 
This Motion is supported by the totality of the file and 
particularly the points raised by the Notice of Objections to 
Proposed Findings and Order of Dismissal dated January 25, 1989, 
^jThese include the following: 
^\ 1. The absence of a hearing on Dismissal violated the 
Plaintiffs1 rights to a hearing on the question of 
dismissal under the Code of Judicial Administration Rule 
4-501(9) . 
2. A trial date was set before the court entered its 
Order Dismissing with Prejudice. Plaintiffs should be. 
entitled to have a trial. 
3. It is not prejudicial to the Defendants, under the 
circumstances, to be forced to go to trial on the 
questions raised by the Plaintiffs* Complaint. 
The court had already ruled on two previous occasions that 
material disputed questions of fact are present, sufficient to 
require trial, and denied two motions for summary judgment. 
Regarding the merits of the action, besides the question of 
whether Plaintiffs did or did not have an agreement which 
Defendants were obligated to perform in connection with a trust 
deed sale, this case involves the question of whether Defendants 
were equitably estopped from selling the property to Barbers. 
Equitable estoppel is claimed against all the Defendants. 
Equitable estoppel is "conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted 
to repudiate his conduct." Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance 
Company, 699 P.2d 686, 691 (Utah 1985). Such a finding is believed 
by the Plaintiff to be expected because of the facts in this case. 
Affidavits by Von Stocking, which are part of the cased file, 
attest to the fact that the Plaintiff did rely to his detriment on 
representations made by each of the groups of Defendants herein. 
Motion for a new trial should be granted and the prior Order 
set aside. 
Dated this 6th day of February, 1989,, 
Raynnona N. MalobJ1 
A t t o r n e y fo r P l a i n t i f f s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true 
and correct copy cf the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL Civil Mo. 22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the 
following: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq• 
56 West Center 
Post Office Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main, Suite 201 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Secretary 
'i&&tLceu&L-
B*ym#nr4 W. M*louf/md ($2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife. 
Plaintiffs, AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N. MALOUF 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
et al . , 
Defendants. Civil No. 22163 
STATE OF UTAH ) ~ " "™ 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
The undersigned, Raymond N. Malouf, being first duly sworn, 
states the following of his own personal knowledge and beliefs 
1. I am the attorney representing the Plaintiffs herein. 
2. Plaintiffs* case was brought and is maintained in good 
faith, and the Flaintiffs desire to resolve the disputes with the 
Defendants. 
3. Plaintiffs have moved forward with the case as quickly 
as their schedule ana counsel's schedule would allow, in view of 
the limited discovery responses and the totality of events needing 
their attention. 
4. The undersigned knows the Plaintiffs olesire to go to 
trial on this matter, and that a trial dare has been set and not 
vacated. 
5. The undersigned believes the Law entitles his clients to 
go to court for the reasons set forth in the pleadings heretofor 
filed, and that failure to allow this matter to go to trial would 
constitute an irregularity in the proceedings of the court and an 
A 
error in law . ^ t| \ 
Dated t h i s 6 th day of ^Felnrqary,. v 
Number™HL] . 
FILED Ra^mortft ^C)HT'ourjj 
A t t o r n e y fo r P l a f n t i f f j 
F r '1 mag 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me ihis 
6th day of February, 1989, by Raymond N.. Malouf , attorney for 
Plaintiffs herein. 
NOTARY PUBLIC * " 
Commission Expires: Residing Att Logan, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N. MALOUF. 
Civil No. 22183. was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq. N. George Daines, Esq. 
56 West Center 108 North Main, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 525 Logan. Utah 84321 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
>^ ff£a? o&&***tA*Ct 
Secretary 
k HOGGAN 
:YS AT LAW 
rCENTER 
OX 525 
TAH 84321 
52 1551 
L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR TIE COUNTY OF CACHE 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. ) 
STOCKING, husband and wife, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ) 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED ) 
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as ) 
officers and as individuals, ) 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; ) 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, ) 
successor beneficiaries; N. ) 
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANTS 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, 
FRED HUNSAKER, BRIAN CHADAZ 
AND BRAD H. BEARNSON TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 22183 
For their response to Plaintiffs' Motion For A New Trial, the 
Defendants First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Logan, 
Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson, state: 
1. That there has been no trial of this case. This issue 
was put to the Court on a Motion To Dismiss for failure to 
prosecute and decided by the Court from the record in the file on 
said Motion. It is therefore inappropriate to consider a Motion 
For A New Trial when no prior trial has been held. 
2. The argument set forth by Plaintiffs for a new trial is 
the same argument submitted by Plaintiffs in opposition to the 
FEB 0 8 |9fl9 
FILED 
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Motlon of these Defendants to dismiss and was considered by 
the Court prior to signing the Findings and Decree. The Court 
having already considered and rejected said argument, the same 
should be overruled by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, having replied to Plaintiffs' Motion For A New 
Trial, these Defendants pray said Motion be denied. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 1989. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
L. Brent Hoggan //tf 
Attorney for Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of thf. foregoing 
Response Of Defendants First Federal Savings And Loan Association 
Of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz And Brad Bearnson To 
Plaintiffs' Motion For A New Trial, to Plaintiffs' Attorney, 
Raymond N. Malouf, at 150 East 200 North, Suite D, Logan, Utah 
84321; and to N. George Daines, Attorney for himself and 
Defendants Barber, at 108 North Main, Suite 200, Logan, Utah 
84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 8th day of February, 
1989. 
L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/8 
N. George Daines « 0303 
DAINES & KANE 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-4403 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. * 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
* 
Plaintiffs, RESPONSE TO MOTION 
* FOR NEW TRIAL 
VS. 
* Civil No. 22183 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
et al., * 
Defendants, 
COME NOW the Defendants DAINES & KANE and Norman and Helen 
Barber and respond to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial as 
follows: 
1. The Affidavit of Raymond N, Malouf and the attached 
Memorandum in support of motion add no further information to the 
court that was not available at the time that the court 
previously ruled in this matter. It is obvious from the records 
that Plaintiffs have not moved this matter forward aid have 
objected to the Defendants efforts to do so. These objections 
have gone on long enough that a dismissal as ordered by the court 
is entirely appropriate and regular. 
WHEREFORE Defendants pray that the court denies Plaintiffs 
Motion for a new trial. 
phpr p\ DATED this *# day of February, 1989. 
flB 0 9 1$6t 
B 9 1989 
DAINES & KANE / 
1/ ^" / / 
/N. Geo/tje Dairies 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Motion for New Trial was mailed this _J2 
day of February,, ]909 to the following: 
L. Brent Hoggan 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84321 
Raymond N. Malouf 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, UT 84321 Qjj/ Ydfrjf///^, 
Secretary 
D891/4108 
Raymond N. Malcuf/'md (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0U2T 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
Q 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife. 
Plaintiffs, REPLY BY THE PLAINTIFFS IN 
vs. SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN, 
et al • , 
Defendants. Civil No. 22183 
In supuort of its Motion for New Trial. Plaintiffs Reply, and 
show the Court: 
1. The Motion by Von K. Stocking and Donna H. Stocking for 
a New Trial is a legitimate request. In Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 
reference was made to Moon Lake Electric Association, 99 U.A.R* 25, 
* December, 1988. Defendants have not attempted to distinguish that 
case. Clearly, there does not need to be a "trial" before this 
Motion is made. 
2» Plaintiffs remind the Court that it never granted the 
Plaintiffs a hearing, contrary to Rule 4-501(9) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing. 
Just because the Court did not grant it does not mean that the 
Court intentionally failed to grant it. Defendants have failed to 
show why a hearing is not required. In asking the Court to deny 
the Motion, the Court is being asked to compound its failure to 
follow Rules Plaintiffs are entitled to expect the Court to follow. 
3. Defendants have failed to justify the fact that this case 
was set for a ]ur/ trial prior to the time the Court granted the 
Defendants* Motion to Dismiss under Rule 41»h). 
4. It was not until October 6, 1937 that the Defendants 
Berbers* Motion i or Summary Judgment was denied by this Court 
saying there were issues of fact. The action was inin.illv f ; I * 1 
by the Plaintiffs November 3, 1982. The Defendants were obviously 
willing to allow the matter to sit for five years. The additional 
delay between October 1957 and when trial was actually set is not 
inconsistent with the case. The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
reversed Rule 41(b) dismissals for lesser reasons. See Utah Oil 
Company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1977) and Westlnghouse 
Electric Supply v» Paul Larsen , 544 P. 2d 876 ill t ah 1975) • In 
West i nqhouse, the Court said it is commendable to get mattes on the 
trial calendar, but said it was even more important to keep in mind 
that the reason for courts was to afford people the opportunity to 
have justice finally done. 
5. Where the Court has denied Motions for Summary Judgment 
made by each of the Defendants in the past, equity requires that 
this matter go to trial. For whatever reason the delay, the matter 
is on the trial calendar and the Plaintiffs have expressed a 
willingness to move the case forward now, Defendants have failed 
to show how the deiay has been prejudicial, and have themselves 
acquiesced in most of the delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have adequately shown that the facts justify 
presentation at trial. A jury trial has been set. The Plaintiffs 
moved for a New Trial on the issue of whether any delay has been 
prejudicial. The Defendants have failed to show how the delay l:xs 
been prejudicial. Dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b) is not 
rational, but is prejudicial against the P Lai nt i f f s ' legal rigtt.-s. 
The Defendants have each failed to show any good reason why trial 
cannot go forward now.. The Motion for a New Trial, even though 
the matter has only been resolved so far by motion, is clearly a 
legal one, upheld in December, 1968, by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated this /0 day of February, 1969„ 
* ^ / If )\v 7" s 
S3^&iiA^: 
Raymond N. Mai our 
A11 orney f or P1 aInt i ff s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th d^y or February, 1989. a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Civil No. 
22183, was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
L • Brent Hogg an , Esq . N . George Dalnes, Esq. 
56 West Center 108 North Main, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 525 Logan, Utah 84321 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
Secretary 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING, and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, Husband and Wife 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER, and BRIAN CHADAZ as 
officers and as individuals; 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER AND HELEN BARBER 
successor beneficiaries; N. 
GEORGE DAINES and JOHN DOES 
1-8, 
Defendants 
Defendant/ First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Logan, Fred HunsaJcer, and Brian Chadaz, Brad Bearnson, have 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging there are 
no genuine issue of facts in regard to a breach of contract 
by the plaintiff in failing to make payments when due pursuant 
to written contract. 
The defendants do agree there was some conversation as to 
how plaintiffs may cure their default. It is the defendants 
position they reached no accord. It is the plaintiff's 
position that they were in fact in default but there were 
conversations where there was an offer made by the defendants 
and an accord was reached. The affidavits supporting both 
memorandums are contradictory in this regard and also on other 
issues raised fcy the memorandum and affidavits. Since tl~ey 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 2218 3 
are in conflict as to these facts, there remains issues i±i:t 
must be tried to make this determination. 
Therefore, the motion for partial summary judgment by the 
above named defendants is denied. Counsel for plaintiff to 
prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this j ^ day of March, 1^84. 
BY THE COURT: •  
/ r / ; . •  • -1 ) 
• •• / / i / /.. ' " ••! 7 x 
/(,-- j? l \A> \ *— '' 
VeWoy^Cljristofferseji 
District Judge ^ / 
*• • * k 
i Ccoy oHhe abova m«il^ alJ<i 
Riyifl0jid..llUtolia^^Jifi4E*-2DIUia^jD,^ogan. Utah 84321 
Btad-E^. B^rxi«aa-^^iI*ii .-Losan^-Uti»h-84321 
ihis.Ja..../dayof-...J..:MiiJ^U-.»---,l?---S-/i. N. George Daines 
3ETH S.'ALLEN, Cfak / , 128 No, Main 
^ / (l~JUil fHr^ L°8an, Utah 84321 
r;r: 35 377 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY Op CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA 
H. SOTCKING, husband and 
wife, 
Plaitniff 
v. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 22183 
Defendants Norman Barber, Helen Barber, and N. George 
Daines have filed their motion for partial summary judgment on 
the basis that the affidavits of Brian Chadaz, Mr. Brad Bearnson 
and Mr. Fred Hunsaker, who were the representatives of the 
defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Logan, 
stated under oath there has been no contact between First Federal 
and the three defendants that would support any effort on the part 
of the defendants Barter and Daines that would interfere with the 
rights of the plaintiff. 
This is, however, disputed by affidavits attached to plaintiff's 
response that would contest the facts in the affidavits of Chadaz 
Bearnson
 f and Hunsaker. Where the facts are contested, summary 
judgment is not appropriate and the motion for partial summary 
judgment will be denied. 
/tlouri&ei'ijpq: plaitniffs to prepare the appropriate order. 
,
;
' Dated this V:::^ L _day of October, 198 7, 
* »S 
BY TH^ ' COURT:' 
i -••' \ . x, . . Tr,i\ -^..- vy , . Vteftoy Vhr l s to r f f b r s e n 
^n/^r^c)[^ : 
Of:!'? 1937 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and 
DONNA H. STOCKING, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiff 
V. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al 
Defendants 
MEMO RANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 2 218 3 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for a New Trial. The::e 
was no trial in this case, the issue was put to the Court on a 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and decided by the 
Court from the record on that basis. Plaintiffs have, in their 
motion, used the same arguments that were used on the prior motion. 
Therefore, the Motion for a New:Trial is denied and 
counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this /j^ l day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: /'// 
I', J -T77. 
VeNoy, 'cfrri'stiof f a ikatv ' 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as 
officers and as individuals, 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
successor beneficiaries; N. 
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING NEW TklAL 
) 
Civil No. 22183 
In this matter the Court having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on January 
27, 1989 dismissing Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein 
with prejudice and Plaintiffs having thereafter filed with this 
Court a Motion For New Trial and in support thereof having filed a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Defendants having filed 
responsive Memorandum to said Motion For New Trial and the Plain-
tiff a rebuttal to Defendants' response, and the Court having 
examined the Motion of Plaintiffs and the Memoranda of the parties 
for and against the same, now finds that the arguments of Plain-
tiffs in support of their Motion For New Trial were the same 
NIT'1-* \ A . i i — — 
HAR 0 I UW \:V. !.' C> 
t«f 
E H O G G A N 
YS AT LAW 
r CENTER 
3X 525 
TAN 84321 
52 1551 
>N OFFICIE: 
ST MAIN 
i x l l 5 
UTAH 8 4 3 3 7 
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jarguraents submitted by Plaintiffs in their opposition to 
Defendants' MotLon to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Complaint and that there 
are no new matters or arguments raised by Plaintiffs in said 
Motion For New Trial and the Court on February 27, 1989 having 
pade and entered its Memorandum Decision, and the Court being 
(fully adivsed In the premises, it is now 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs1 Motion For New 
(Trial be and the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this J ^ day of March, 1989 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally served an exact copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying New Trial upon N. George Hainesy 
Attorney for himself and Defendants Barber, and upon Raymond ivf. 
Malouf, Attorney for Plaintiffs, by delivering a copy to each at 
their law offices in Logan, Utah, this 1st day of March, 1989, 
iVt fa kf P a r ^ f 
S e c r e t a r y tt> L. Brent Hoggan 
LBH/38 
Raymond N» Malouf/bh (#2067) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
150 East 200 North, Suite D 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H. 
STOCKING, husband and-wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED 
HUNSAKER and BRYAN CHADAZ, as 
officers and as individuals; 
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee; 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
successor beneficiaries; N. 
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE; OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 8300;.'i2183 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that; Plaintiffs, Von K. Stocking and 
Donna H. Stocking, through counsel, Raymond N* Malouf* appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court the final Order of the Honorable VeMoy 
Christoffersen, District Judge, entered in this matter on January 
27, 1989. Further, Plaintiffs appeal from the Court*.5. denial of 
Plaintiffs1 Motion For a Mew Trial under Rule 59(a) maae February 
6, 1989, which Order denying the new trial was made Marc'n 14, 1969. 
The effect of the Orders appealed from was to dismiss Plaintiffs" 
action under Rule 41(b) with prejudice. 
FILED 
N
^eSsm^Qii.i'^ 
APR 111983 
The appeal is taken from the entire Order. 
Dated this 12th day of April, 1969. 
C -N 
J2& 
Raymond «'. Malouf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1969, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed 
postage prepaid to the following; 
L. Brent Hoggan, Esq, 
56 West Center 
Post Office Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-0525 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main, Suite 201 
Logan, Utah 84321 
( k ^ X . f|oJlTL^ Q^ 
Secretary 
LAW OWICtS 
D A I N E S * KANE 
121 NOHTH MAIM 
LOGAN. UTAH $4321 
M. OEOftOE DAIMCt 
KEVIN £ KANE 
29 August 198 
Mr. Raymond Malouf 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan. Utah 84321 
Re; Barber v. Emporium 
Dear Ray: 
Norm Barber^ aJftT I have exanined^He^Von 
Stocking home and Relieve that its worth would^p robably 
be somewhere in ttye range of $45-60,000.00. We 1believe 
to determine its -vXalue accurately, a professiop4l appraisals ^ *^7£'V 
should be done. IrK^iscussing various appr>i^ers, Norm JCO '• Jf < 
Barber and I felt tW^*^? ftf?t EJpprF4"^^^"1 A probably \ ^ J ^ ' 
be Tom Singleton, but perhaps, if you have someone else in '•*•'•'' 
mind, we would accept an appraisal upon advance clearance \-' 
of the individual involved. 
It would be my suggestion that you prepare that 
appraisal at your expense and submit it to us for our review. 
Upon reviewing that we may well be able to consummate some 
kind of an arrangement regarding your liability to Norm Barber. 
Anticipating that this is going to take several weeks 
to determine what the appraisal of that home is and the 
likelihood that the home is insufficient to pay the full 
amount of the judgment. T thiriK it is advisable that we 
continue with the Supplemental Order that was started 
this w^ gi- _ Fiease consider this formal notice, pursuant 
to our arrangement, that you should be prepared and at court 
the next motion and order day to continue answering questions 
regarding this supplemental proceedings. You should also 
be advised that we have served a notice to appear on your wife* 
your father and also Carl Malouf, to determine more concerning 
the arrangements between yourself and these individuals. 
I also anticipate preparation and perhaps filing of a lawsuit 
involving fra^ nhil^ nf oomrryanca agninnt some of these parties. 
I fees strongly that you should come forward now and make 
Mr. Raymond Malouf 
25 August 1983 
Page Two 
definitive arrangements to taka care of your obligation in 
this situation. Mr. Barter is insistent that you do so. 
Sincerely, 
DAINES & KANE 
/w. George Daines 
Attorney at Law 
U 
ec Bora Barter 
Raymond N, Malouf/dh (68:EMBAAFV.RDP) 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: 752-9380 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF VON STOCKING 
vs. 
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE, 
JR,, and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR., 
Defendants. Civil No. 25616 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
Comes now Von K. Stocking and being first duly sworn deposes 
and states the following of his own oersonal knowledge: 
1. That he i s a Defendarit in tile apove named a c t i o n . 
2. That he was a Defendant in Civil No. 17630. 
3. That he owned the property described in book 189 page 
458 in a Trust Deed given to First Federal Savings & Loan on 
March 18, 1976. 
4. That the afore-described property was a home with a 
basement apartment worth far in excess of $33,191.94 that 
Plaintiffs Norman and Helen Barber paid First Federal for in 
their purchase of the beneficial rights on or about November 3, 
1983. 
5. That he knows Norman and Helen Barber bid $33,191.94 at 
the trust deed sale on this property on November 4, 1983. 
fit*J £/-to-$? 
$• That he is familiar with the representations from 
Plaintiffs made by letter dated August 29, 1983 where Barbers 
alleged that the property was worth between $45,000 and $60,000, 
and knows that, for the date of the sale, such values were 
conservative. 
7. On November 2nd and 3rd, 1983 he was involved in 
several conversations initiated by George Daines, attorney for 
Plaintiffs who asked him to agree to let the Barbers take over 
this property aforementioned by paying First Federal, and 
applying between $12,000 and $15,000 against the prior judgment 
to his credit, plus giving Von Stocking an additional $3,000. 
8. That Mr. Daines continued these conversations while 
the undersigned was trying to cure the default with First Federal 
and until the morning of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1983. 
9. That there was no doubt that the Barbers wanted to take 
over this property in order to collect from me on the judgment 
they had against the Emporium, the undersigned, Don and Ray. 
10. That he relied on the representations by Mr. Daines on 
behalf of Plaintiffs that he would credit the prior judgment, and 
believed he had kept his word, which the undersigned has very 
good notes on, because Plaintiffs took no further action to 
collect from the undersigned until the prior judgment almost 
expired. 
11. That Mr. Daines represented that he wanted each of the 
individual Defendants in the prior judgment to pay only the 
percentage of the prior judgment equal to their percentage of the 
Emporium Partnership. 
12. That if Mr. Daines did not intend to go through with 
what he promised on behalf of his clients, the Plaintiffs should 
be required to honor his promises since Plaintiffs in fact 
proceeded to take over the property, and the undersigned relied 
on these representations by their attorney. In fact, Mr. Daines 
was fraudulent in his representations, but this fraud, of not 
crediting the prior Barber judgment, did not become apparent 
until 
2 /£ 
February 7, 1987 when Mr. Daines again served Mr. Stocking's wife 
with a Motion and Order for Mr. Stocking to appear in Supplemen-
tal proceedings on the prior judgment. 
DATED this J3 day of April, 1987. 
,^071/fc 
lckxx K. Stockincr ' Von king
Von K. Stocking having been duly sworn on oath deposes and 
states that he is the affiant and that he has read the foregoing 
Affidavit, knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be 
true and as to items stated on information and belief, the same 
are believed to be true. 
^ ^ / ^ > ^ ^ W 
Von K. Stocking ' 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this /«3c day of April, 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Commission Expires: y'Jt'J'pY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^0 day of April, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Von Stocking was 
mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
108 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
Secretary 
/? 
